Revista de Historia de la Psicología, 2025, Vol. 46(3), 23–38

Revista de Historia de la Psicología

www.revistahistoriapsicologia.es

Idols that beset the psychologist's mind
Johannes Linschoten's lectures and unpublished writings 1953-1964

René van Hezewijk
Open University of the Netherlands

INFORMACIÓN ART.

Recibido: 16 abril 2025
Aceptado: 30 julio 2025

Key words
Linschoten,
complementarity,
phenomenology

ABSTRACT

Johannes (Hans) Linschoten (1925-1964) was a prominent Dutch psychologist and very influential in Dutch psychology due to many articles and a few books he published during his short lifetime. Much appraised were his volume on the psychology of William James (Linschoten, 1959) and his *Idolen van de psycholoog* (1964). Most Dutch psychologists considered the latter book as a breach with phenomenology. In this article I claim it was not a breach. As discussed elsewhere he continued his view, be it with other means. To test my hypothesis, I examined the available copies of the lectures he gave from 1957 and 1964. I further examined a handwritten draft for a chapter on "the methodology of psychological research" (written in 1953) and refer to articles written at about the same time as his *Idolen*. His view always has been that phenomenology and experimental research were both inevitable. His unique view completed the complementarity principle that William James had suggested but not had been able to finish. His view also suggested how to resolve some issues in the philosophy of psychology of the 20th century.

Ídolos que acosan la mente del psicólogo
Lecturas y escritos inéditos de Johannes Linschoten 1953-1964

Palabras clave
Linschoten,
complementariedad,
fenomenología

RESUMEN

Johannes (Hans) Linschoten (1925-1964) fue un destacado psicólogo holandés, y tuvo mucha influencia en la psicología holandesa debido a muchos artículos y algunos libros que publicó durante su breve vida. Su volumen sobre la psicología de William James (Linschoten, 1959) y sus *Ídolos del psicólogo* (1964) fueron muy apreciados. La mayoría de los psicólogos holandeses consideraron este último libro una ruptura con la fenomenología. En este artículo afirmo que no fue una ruptura, sino que continuó su visión, aunque con otros medios. Para probar mi hipótesis, examiné las conferencias disponibles que dio entre 1957 y 1964. Además, examiné un borrador manuscrito de un capítulo sobre «la metodología de la investigación psicológica» (escrito en 1953), y me remito a algunos artículos escritos aproximadamente al mismo tiempo que sus Ídolos del psicólogo. Su opinión siempre ha sido que la investigación fenomenológica y la experimental eran inevitables. Esta visión única debe considerarse la culminación del principio de complementariedad, que había sugerido William James, pero que no había podido terminar.

Part of this article was presented at the XXXVII Symposium of the Sociedad Española de Historia de la Psicología, Valencia, 9-11 April 2025. The article enhances work presented in the biography of Johannes Linschoten (Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2024). I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their comments that helped me to substantially improve the article.

Correspondence René van Hezewijk, Plaza España 1, 29170, Colmenar, Málaga, Spain. Email: renevanhezewijk@me.com

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

Para citar este artículo/ To cite this article:
Van Hezewijk, R. (2025). Idols that beset the psychologist's mind
Johannes Linschoten's lectures and unpublished writings 1953-1964. *Revista de Historia de la Psicología, 46*(3), 23-38. Doi: 10.5093/rhp2025a20

Vínculo al artículo/Link to this article:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

Introduction

A few weeks after his early death (1964, 38 years old), Johannes Linschoten's ultimate book was published: *Idolen van de psycholoog*[1] (Linschoten, 1964). It became the most popular book among psychologists and students of psychology in the Netherlands, according to a questionnaire held in the 1980s and 19890s (De Ridder, 1992). Perhaps one of the reasons for its popularity was its ironic style, cutting the edge between those included and excluded (Van Hezewijk, 2024). Another more important reason may have been the apparent, unexpected breach with the alleged phenomenological orientation of Linschoten. Till the publication of his *Idols,* he was known as a member of the phenomenologically oriented Utrecht School, who became the successor of Frederik Buytendijk. In the early years of his career he had published a number of articles and chapters in which he demonstrated his talent to write in the phenomenological style (Linschoten, 1949, 1951, 1954, 1955c, 1956b). However, his Doctoral thesis and PhD thesis used experimental research and concluded that a psychology without phenomenology was a dead-end street (Linschoten, 1952, 1956a). In another paper he advocated the same conclusion (Linschoten, 1955a, 1955b).

His last book but one was a study of William James as a precursor of phenomenology (Linschoten, 1959). Later it was translated into German and English (Linschoten, 1961a, 1968). It interpreted William James's works, especially his *Principles of Psychology* (1890), as showing the way to a phenomenological psychology. In his analysis, Linschoten showed profound insight into James's works, emphasizing James's multiplicity of principles, the strength of his "systematic un-systematicity," the principle of complementarity, the continuity of conscious experiences, and the features of incarnation[2] (almost) in opposition to language.

The James book was highly praised, especially by fellow phenomenologists. Reading the title, they concluded that James had been the the proto-phenomenologist that led to Husserl and their own phenomenological versions of psychology. Not only in Utrecht and the Netherlands, but also in Germany and, after posthumous translation, American authors like Amedeo Giorgi (Giorgi, 1965, 1966, 1983), Kockelmans (Kockelmans, 1987), and Van Kaam (Van Kaam, 1966) were impressed. Giorgi even translated and edited Linschoten's book and one of his articles (Linschoten, 1968, 1971).

However, in his ultimate publication *Idols* (1964) Linschoten seemed to have completely changed his mind. Apparently, he pleaded for experiment and abstract modelling in psychology, opposing (again apparently) phenomenology. The book even made fun of phenomenologists.

The reactions were divided. Those who were in favor of the upcoming influence of American experimental psychology praised it highly. For instance two younger colleagues (Vlek & De Klerk, 1965–1966) praised the book's contrast with his earlier views. They regretted his early death and suggested he could have become the Newton of psychology. A more balanced review was written by Bert Duijker (Duijker, 1964) who agreed with the main message of the book, although criticizing some aspects of it. In his inaugural lecture accepting his appointment to professor of methodology, Evert Joost Zwaan, one of the editors of Linschoten's book, pleaded for his approach in psychology and also in pedagogy (Zwaan, 1978). Ever since the publication the citations of his *Idols* were abundant, often suggesting it had been the manifesto for the positivistic or experimental approach in psychology.

The reactions of those who were not in favor were less explicit. Because of his death just before the publication their reviews in the Dutch psychology journals avoided publicly confronting his recent views. For instance Buytendijk's obituary of Linschoten praised his contribution to psychology but hardly mentioned his recent book (Buytendijk, 1964). However, when he had read *Idols* a year later, he confessed in a letter to his colleague Strasser that he had read it "this weekend [and that] it had shocked him deeply." He compared it's passion and cleverness with the work of Hitler and Goebbels (Buytendijk & Strasser, 1965). In an interview Jos Dijkhuis, the later dean of the faculty that psychology belonged to, confessed he had read it "only years later", and still was horrified by it (Dijkhuis, 1999).

In hindsight, some authors later suggested his book predicted the growing influence, if not dominance, of the American (or APA) style of psychological research in the practices of psychologists (Dehue, 1990, 1995; Van Strien, 1993). Later generations of psychologists (Derksen, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; Spinhoven, 1999; Terwee, 1987, 1990) mainly were in favor although not always for the reasons Linschoten must have intended. But they agreed about his change of mind and often supported his experimental orientation.

As the questionnaire mentioned above (De Ridder, 1992) demonstrates it had become idolized by many, and repudiated by some. In this article, however, I claim that many colleagues have read his works biased by their own idols in the Baconian meaning of the word (Bacon, 1620/1899). The view Stam and I defend is that Linschoten's philosophical ideas of how phenomenology and experiment relate in and for psychology never changed fundamentally (Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2024). Reading only a few of his works may have reinforced some colleagues that he drastically changed his view in his ultimately published book. However, from the first steps in his career till his last writings, published and unpublished, he emphasized the indispensability of phenomenology, experiment and history. His lectures were clear and seriously focused on what he had promised his students, for instance, to explain what to think of Husserl's "design" of psychology. He told them what phenomenology was, at the same time relativizing Husserl's phenomenology. In *Idols* and in the James book he suggested how enhancing James's complementarity principle could lead to the united psychology William James had hoped for.

The lectures

When, 25 years ago, Hank Stam and I started working on Linschoten's biography, (Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2024) we began to wonder what had happened between the 1959 and 1964 publications. To get an idea, we started to read his lectures. The lectures were never published and were all in Dutch, mixed

[1] In the following pages I will refer to this volume as *Idols* or *Idols of the Psychologist*, although unfortunately it has never been translated.

[2] Now known as "embodiment."

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

Figure 1. *Linschoten's lectures 1956-1960*

- *The influence of Husserl on psychology* (originally by Buytendijk 1956-1957) ## 1-13 (+ 200 pages)
- *Lectures on William James* (for pre-candidandi) (1957-1958) ## 1-30 (+ 600 pages)
- *Basic concepts of phenomenology* (for pre-candidandi)(1958-1959) ## 1-19 (+350 pages)
- *Husserl's design of a phenomenological psychology* (candidandi) (1958 -1959) ## 1-10 (+ 150 pp.)
- *Capita Selecta: Rilke's IXth Elegy* (1958) (38 pages)
- *Capita Selecta: The place of Narcissus in literary fiction* (1958) (22 pages)
- *On levels of organization in visual perception* (1959-1960) ## 1-14 (+ 220 pages)
- *Psycholinguistics* (1960) ## 1-10 (+ 160 pages)

with German, English and French citations; they were recorded and transposed into text, mimeographed and made available for students. We could obtain all his material, including the lectures[3]. Thanks to Linschoten's family, many were saved in his archive.

Reading the lectures, we realized that readers of the 1959 volume on James had been beset by their phenomenological idols. Conversely, readers of the 1964 volume saw their idols reflected in it. Many fragments in the lectures made clear there was not a breach between both books in their theoretical content. Of course, not everyone could have followed the lectures or read the mimeographs. But thanks to the archive, we could zoom in to the period that could have demonstrated the change of mind if there had been one.

The lectures held in the years after he had become a professor in 1957 were part of the eye-opening experience. In the archive we found copies of lectures on the following subjects (Figure 1)[4].

Before discussing the important themes in the lectures, it is necessary to make some caveats. One is that not *all* his lectures were available. Some important ones (perhaps) he referred to in the lectures we possessed, could not be found; for instance, a lecture or lecture series on stereoscope-use in psychology.[5] Second, his teaching and research had been interrupted by three life events: his visit as a visiting professor in the first half of 1961 to Duquesne University, USA, and his heart attack in the USA at a conference in Philadelphia. Another interruption was his hospitalization for three months for what may have been a psychotic attack or severe depression.

The lectures urged Stam and me to reread both volumes, and I came to interpret the two volumes differently than when I had read them as a student. We decided the books are complementary and should be read and interpreted as two sides of the same coin. Both works illustrate Linschoten's delicate philosophical position on how phenomenology and experimental psychology are related. It all depends on the questions asked, and how and where to find answers. In the following sections I discuss some of the themes that demonstrate the strong relation between, and the complementarity of, phenomenology and experiment supporting the unity of psychology that Linschoten saw as the horizon for his work. The themes, as well as criticism of biased phenomenologists *and* experimentalists can be found matured in the *Idols* but often was prepared in the lectures.

Phenomenology

In the first half of the twentieth century, especially in Europe, one of the most disputed philosophical theories (or epistemologies) in psychology was 'phenomenology.' Considering the emphasis Linschoten put on the complementarity of phenomenology and experiment it is important to briefly discuss what he meant by that and look at how he gradually developed its interpretation and implication.

Initially, in his PhD thesis, Linschoten took the standpoint of "the phenomenological psychology, that [he] would like to indicate as the science of the *intentional* relations between humans and the world" (Linschoten, 1956a, p. 12, my emphasis). In its bibliography he referred to a text "not yet published" at the time of writing and defending his thesis. It seems probable, however, that he referred to a text prepared for a talk in Germany that we found in his archive. In it he still saw "phenomenological principles as considering both the founding of psychology, the questions for the object of psychology and the methodology of this science; they consider in last instance issues of the theory of science and of knowledge" (Linschoten, 1955b, p. 1). He suggested it is the approach that will show how a Gestalt psychologist and a behaviorist will find "the common ground" for their discussion. In other words, it accepts the positivistic principles, but the phenomenologist will look for the philosophical foundation of their theories.

This standpoint explains how in the earlier years of his career he could accept and even use experiments to demonstrate the ultimate value of phenomenology as the founding principle of psychology. It didn't add a methodology to psychology. And phenomenology did not solve concrete psychological problems. Therefore, most psychologists ignored it. But the psychologist involved in fundamental research needs to find out how the participants in an experiment experience

[3] His archived material amounted to almost 10000 photocopied pages; the 1700 pages of lectures included.

[4] In the Dutch academic education system in the 1950s there were three phases: the propedeuse (the first year after which an exam had to be taken), the phase where students were *pre-candidandi* (second and third year, ending with a '*kandidaatsexamen*'), and the phase of *candidandi*, (years 4 and5) that ended with the doctoral exam, which allowed one to use the title of drs. (abbreviation of doctorandus). After that some could work on their 'proefschrift', comparable with a PhD thesis; when attained they were a doctor, the highest academic degree. From 1982 onwards the bachelor-master structure was gradually introduced in Europe that could end, optionally, by writing a PhD thesis.

[5] In research for his PhD thesis on binocular depth perception, Linschoten used the stereoscope in 130 experiments.

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

situations such as perceiving objects in depth. He therefore asks the question how and what the participant perceives in the experimental task, the stimulus, the achievement. He wants to know about the structure of the phenomenon itself, not of the abstract thoughts about it or of the optical, or physiological causes leading to it.

This typed text in some other forms repeats itself in his later lectures and even appears to have been a chapter in a (in 1953!) already planned book about general psychology.[6] This can be concluded from handwritten fragments of chapters about a diversity of subjects found in the archives. The text quoted above (Linschoten, 1955b) is numbered XXV, just like a handwritten text that is part of the planned book. Interestingly both the typed-out text and the handwritten text partially overlap and are both the only chapters that seem to have been completed in draft. Only a few notes and the bibliography had to be added.

In the lectures of these years there are many aspects and ideas of these early texts that return. However, in the later lectures the emphasis has changed. The lectures of the period 1956-1958 were focused on phenomenology but often referred to experimental work. They were given by a teacher who was well-trained in experiments. The lectures of the period 1959-1960 were focused on empirical research but given by a teacher well-informed in phenomenology. There is a growing focus on the role phenomenology can play in the context of an experiment, less on the search for the deeper, "proto verbal" experiences that would have constituted, according to Husserl, the ultimate (or absolute) presuppositions of psychology as a science. Whereas Husserl was searching for the basic human experiences before language could have provided the words to formulate the essences a science dealt with, Linschoten became critical of Husserl's enterprise. This is shown in how Linschoten, after having become Buytendijks's successor, dealt with the task of instructing students on phenomenology.

The Professor's Lecture

Linschoten was appointed professor and successor to Buytendijk in 1957 after he had received his PhD in 1956. He was 32 years old. As a successor to Buytendijk, he took over his teaching, including 13 lectures on 'The Influence of Husserl'. Linschoten started to use Buytendijk's mimeographed lectures. Soon, he became dissatisfied, if not disappointed. For instance, Lecture IV of the series, originally given by Buytendijk, is covered with remarks, comments and text erasing, as we can see almost aggressively (Figure 2).

Figure 2. *Buytendijk's Lecture IV, pp 3-4 with Linschoten's annotations*



[6] I will come back to this later.

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

Some of Linschoten's colleagues we interviewed experienced Buytendijk's lectures about Husserl as way too abstract, supposing students were already well-known with Husserl, Binswanger, Heidegger, Jaspers, etc. They were not ready for Buytendijk's interpretation of the phenomenologists. Moreover, Buytendijk often changed his views depending on the book he had recently read or the letters he had exchanged with famous European scholars.

So, the following year, Linschoten drastically changed the Introduction to Phenomenology to the level he supposed first-year students had, starting with lectures on William James. These lectures eventually resulted in Linschoten's book on James (Linschoten, 1959). As in the book, he introduced the students to the thoughts of William James. He explained the specialty of James's approach and how he went as deep as one could go into the presuppositions of doing psychology seriously, sincerely and thoroughly. Linschoten explained that Husserl had found the "spark" to develop phenomenology in James's *Principles of Psychology*. Husserl said it was through reading William James that he began sharpening his (Husserl's) thoughts after the false start of suggesting psychology was the absolute foundation of all science, including logic. This was contested by, among others, Gottlob Frege (Kusch, 1995). However, Husserl had destroyed the two lectures that allegedly demonstrated this. Husserl acknowledged his debt to James but clarified that he had seen where James eventually failed and Husserl continued.[7] James could not accept Brentano's introduction of the intentionality of consciousness, especially not where Brentano had accepted the possibility of the intentionality of non-existent reality. By intentionality Brentano meant that all mental activity (thinking, perceiving, consciousness, remembering) always was *about* something; thinking did not exist as a thing without a thing thought of, even of things that did not exist in reality. James could not accept that the intentional *thoughts* about, for instance, unicorns were real, although, in nature, unicorns do not exist. Husserl clarified how this is possible, assuming (phenomenologically) that the thoughts we are conscious of are real if their consequences are real.

Basic Concepts and Design of Phenomenology.

So, in 1958 Linschoten started lecturing on "Husserl's Design of Psychology" (for candidandi) and on "Basic Concepts of Phenomenology" for pre-candidandi. Step by step, in an obvious way, he introduced his students to phenomenology. In the introductory lectures on the Basic Concepts of Phenomenology, he took some weeks to show the history of the concept of phenomenology as it developed from Johan Heinrich Lambert to Kant, to Hegel, to Rosenkrantz, to Hamilton (!), M. Lazarus to Gusdorf and Natorp, and also how Ernst Mach, Carl Stumpf came to their views. Finally, Linschoten said, Husserl found a more or less final (though unfinished) understanding of what phenomenology could be or should be. The varieties of phenomenology developed by Heidegger, Binswanger, Jaspers, and many others sprang from there.

To explain what phenomenology was, students were made familiar with terms like "the given," "the phenomenon" (or phenomena), "the example", and "the essence." He explained how phenomenology is a search for essences of experience through language. A phenomenologist wants to start from the immediate, given experience, an experience not yet influenced by how the selective and formative nature of words slice continuous changing experience into digestible units. In other words, psychology as the science of consciousness had to start with what is given in consciousness *before* the words that we use in daily life divide our experiences in "phenomena." Only after having analyzed the immediately given experiences, it would be possible to use the purified words, filtered as the essences that sciences (also natural sciences) work with. This is, as Linschoten later realized, a process of reduction, reduction to words, that name essences. Paradoxically, this reduction process necessarily distances one from the immediately experienced reality of the stream of consciousness (as James would have it). By "reduction of the immediately given," using examples of the "immediate situation" as he began to call it, to the 'phenomenon' that is named and thereby selectively evoked, to the words that abstract the essence of comparable situations from the phenomena with which science can work. But he immediately made it clear that words are no more than signs signaling in the direction of what *was* experienced before there were words that claim to express the experience and reflect on it. He warned his students that when a phenomenologist uses words to describe and discover the essences of phenomena, it is an act of reduction. Words are not the things experienced. When experiencing a situation, it is impossible to simultaneously step back and distance oneself from what one has experienced before there was any verbal sign indicating the experience. We see a long, linear, curved object in the grass of our garden, and we are immediately startled until we have a better look and notice it is not a snake but a garden hose. But then, the immediate experience had already been replaced by another abstract and verbalized experience.

Some examples he used in his lectures to illustrate what phenomenologists mean were later used with some added irony in his *Idols* book, which almost all its readers read as the conversion to positivism, empirical-analytical, or experimental psychology. He discussed, for instance, Gelb & Goldstein in lecture XV (p.2) of the series called Basic Concepts of Phenomenology, where Linschoten criticizes them for their claim that some lesion in the visual cortex of one of their patients suggested that he lost his sense of abstraction. Linschoten's criticism is that they unfoundedly presupposed that there are absolute levels of abstraction. They concluded that this patient missed the capacity to differentiate between level L1 of abstraction and level L2. Their patient was trapped in the concrete, they said, and, for instance, could not relativize 'as if positions.' Knowing that snow is white, their patient could not say playfully that snow is black. Gelb and Goldstein took the levels as absolute, anatomically localizable levels. They were seduced by language, language that suggests that

[7] Interestingly, it was through his lecturing on Husserl that Linschoten may have discovered William James. Husserl acknowledged his debt to James for seeing the "spark" in one of his diaries. Linschoten told his students Husserl held two lectures in which he had explained how he received the spark that enlightened him, but they had been destroyed by Husserl himself, so we cannot know what Husserl learned from James. Linschoten reconstructed what probably had happened. That Linschoten was relatively late in discovering James explains why there is only one reference to James in his PhD thesis, while his James book contained 27 references to different works of James.

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

if we have a name we can use for an experience (or the lack of it), we believe it allows us to discuss the thing or process itself; in this case an anatomical structure that is real, materially real. However, all you could say, says Linschoten, is that there is a greater or lesser degree of abstraction.

He came back to Gelb and Goldstein in *Idols*, as an example of how they had been trapped by the *idola fori* (Bacon), the idols of the market, or *die Verführung der Sprache* (Husserl). As an example of unawareness of the self-implicatedness of psychology, Gelb and Goldstein implicitly decided that their theory of abstractedness as a localizable brain function was corroborated, every time they asked him specific test questions. They did not observe what their patient did in other non-diagnostic situations. There, he had no problem of abstraction.

The lectures for pre-candidandi were followed up in the next year as lectures on *Husserl's Design of Phenomenological Psychology*. Especially in these lectures, there are many ideas and indications of what he would later use in his *Idols* book, although sometimes discussed in a slightly different way, from the other side of the coin, so to speak. This seems strange because *Idols* was interpreted by many as his anti-phenomenology book.

The self-implicatedness of psychology

An important theme in *Idols* went back to his book on James. It was the the *self-implicatedness of psychology*, as he called it. As discussed elsewhere (Van Hezewijk, 2019a, 2019b; Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2007; Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2024), Linschoten unveiled many biases and blindfolds of psychologists, resembling them to what Francis Bacon called the "idols that beset the human mind" (Bacon, 1620/1899, pp. 319-325 of Book 1). Psychologists are as vulnerable to biases as all humans are. However, psychologists study the human mind, so they should be aware of that. Nevertheless, often, they are not. Studying human experience and behavior as a psychologist does not prevent them from falling into the same pitfalls. The self-implicatedness of psychology reflected what William James had already pointed out seven or eight decades earlier than Linschoten. Linschoten borrowed the term from Husserl but turned it on its head. Husserl saw the "*Rückbezogenheit*" (quoted by Linschoten in Idols of the Psychologist, p. 53 Husserl, 1950, p. 152) of using experience to investigate (other) experiences as a sham problem. Linschoten saw it as a major problem for psychology: "Methodologically speaking the experimental subject is a black box. In psychology we meet the situation where one black box investigates another one of the same type." (Linschoten, 1964, p. 88). "The psychologist acquires knowledge about behavior and experience of human beings. This knowledge is disseminated. How easy it is to forget that the disseminating itself, and the interpretation of it are psychological processes themselves" (Linschoten, 1964, p. 206).

As an example, in *Idols*, he cited the case of Clever Hans, Von Osten's horse that was believed to count and calculate. Psychologists Carl Stumpf and his assistant Oskar Pfungst later demonstrated that the horse was responding to cues from Von Osten, who inadvertently signaled when to start or stop scraping its hoof. He used it to demonstrate how easy it is to influence another organism to follow the suggestions of the caretaker, therapist or researcher.

In a lecture for students, he gave another example. Linschoten was well read in classical literature, Greek, German, French, Dutch and English. In an extracurricular so-called *capita selecta* lecture of 1958, he discussed the story of Narcissus and Echo. Linschoten referred to Ovidius's story, which included Echo, the *vocalis nymph* who could not help but talk when someone spoke to her, although she was never the first to speak. According to Linschoten, Echo and Narcissus are parallel stories. The mirror image and Narcissus's falling in love with it are not the essence of the story, he said. In both stories, the look-alike, the double, and the loss of identity are essential. In an interaction with a psychologist the same can happen. When the psychologist, in love with his own genius, is the one who starts talking and the client keeps on echoing what he or she says, the client takes over the psychologist's identity, not necessarily intendedly.

He let the same theme come back in Rilke's Narziss and Malte Laurids Brigge. In the latter story, a child looks in the mirror as she changes her clothing, consequently disguising and forgetting what she wants to be.

In the lectures, and again in his *Idols*, Linschoten pointed out how psychologists, not only phenomenologists, are most vulnerable to the narcissistic approach of projecting their own thoughts onto the patient or the subject of their analysis. Their client or the experimental subject echoes (reflects) the expectation of the psychologist.

So, the self-implicatedness of psychology is one of the important themes after having attained his PhD. The lack of awareness of it is a threat for psychology. It covers the biases of the four idols (Bacon), as well as the projection or transference (*overdracht, Übertragung)*. It fosters subjectivity and threatens objectivity.

In his lectures on Husserl's design of phenomenological psychology, and in the earlier book on William James, he had already signaled the threat of this fallacy. He agreed with Husserl that the *phenomenological* reduction necessary for finding the essence of a phenomenon by exploring the givenness of experiences could not be seen as a *psychological* act. In ordinary life, the initially still unnamed givenness of experiences in natural situations was transformed by its reduction to named phenomena, which subsequently was cognitively or even scientifically abstracted into tacit or explicit knowledge. According to Husserl, this could not be a psychological operation. Husserl realized that, psychologically speaking, one cannot double oneself. One cannot at once control the process of obtaining the essence of experiences and, simultaneously, experience the immediate givenness that results, or should result, in observing and obtaining the (named) phenomenon.

Linschoten agreed that this could not be part of psychology. He emphasized to his students that it should be seen as a *logical* operation by the phenomenologist to explore the core of any science, including natural sciences, and the presuppositions from where psychology would have to start. As Linschoten said, commenting on William James, "[b]ecause James rejected Brentano's first definition of intentionality as [including] intentional non-existence […] he retreats to an associationist description with a behaviorist character. Husserl will define intentionality as free from external and factual relations […] and warns to misinterpret the concept

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

psychologically. *Psychology presupposes the concept that she does not deduce herself.*" (Linschoten, 1959; my italics). In other words, the analysis of the given is a *logical*, not a psychological analysis. It is where Husserl's "*Lebenswelt*," the Life World, and the place of the body in it, entered as the deep source of experiences, as the stream of consciousness.

The 'design lectures' were still focused on how Linschoten saw Husserl's contribution to psychology. But he also emphasized that the word 'design' should not be taken too seriously. Husserl did not tell psychologists how to design their research in a way comparable to experimental designs. Most of the lectures introduced the role of reflection in phenomenology and the consequences of Husserl's view of psychology. The next quotes from his 'Design lectures' demonstrate how he took his students by the hand to evolve the proper understanding.

> *When phenomenology speaks of self-experience, it presupposes the first experience, that of the person physically involved in things, but uses it as the object of its second and proper experience, the reflexive experience. For only in reflexive experience do I discover the things that matter* (Ontwerp III, p. 6).[8]

> *The reflexive attitude tries [...] to reduce the emotional involvement (which is nothing other than bodily involvement in things), not out of aversion to emotion or because the emotional experience would be inferior to the rational, but precisely because it is not a rationality, while in the analysis of experience, it is a rationality, viz. the expression, the formulation, the knowing of that which occurs [...]. The reflection on the emotion, which can justify the emotion, is in itself rationality, after all. The opposition [by phenomenologists] to so-called rationalism is methodically unjustified because even the person who comes to his boss excitedly complaining about what another has done to him tries at that moment to free himself from being carried along directly on the waves of emotion. We already do this in everyday life.* (Ontwerp III, p. 8, my emphasis, RvH)

> *One must say in retrospect that such a Wesensanschauung, the analysis of beings, …* looks like something very ordinary, and in fact, it is. (Phaen. IV, p. 4, my emphasis, RvH)

Objectivity

Soon in his 'Design series', Linschoten related the theme of self-implicatedness to reflection and objectivity. He reasoned that reflecting on one's own experience implies seeing yourself as the investigator and at the same time as the investigated. As I mentioned above, Husserl tried to bagatellize the "*Rückbezogenheit*" in self-reflection. Linschoten did not. In *Idols* this became a major point for discussion, leading to what he called the spurious coupling of experimenter and object.[9] Linschoten related the themes of self-implicatedness and reflection to a third theme, objectivity. Already in the fourth lecture of the 'design series' he introduced this theme to his students. Again, I follow the path he showed his students:

> *We begin to speak of objectivity where phenomena occur as they do to all people. Objectivity as a concept thus does not exceed the concept of common subjectivity.* (Ontwerp IV, p.12).
> *Subjective is … in the first place all that which is given to me in contemplation because I see it. Subjective means, in the second place, corporeality. The body is more intensely subjective than things; it belongs more to me. However, it has the ambiguity which Gabrial Marcel will later distinguish as "être" and "avoir,", being and having a body. The corporeal being that is me is a deeper subjectivity than things; on the other hand, I still have the possibility, as it were, of opposing this corporeality to some extent and treating it as a quasi-thing. This means there is still a third, higher sense of subjectivity. [...] which can set itself in opposition to its own body and says, e.g., my nails are dirty. This is a subjectivity of yet another step further back from the subjective core.* (Ontwerp IV, p.14)

> *Logically, then, self-experience … is a more solid basis for thinking than the acceptance of a co-subjectivity, of a group-subjectivity, while the general opinion would nevertheless be, and the general opinion is also enclosed in Husserl's concept of objectivity, that one cannot build a general thematic on this narrow individualistic basis.* (Ontwerp IV, p.16)

> *Objective, I* [Linschoten] *believe, we have already defined mainly as the property of that which is accessible and verifiable by everyone (in principle to everyone). ... That scientific thinking is not satisfied with this in all cases is understandable. The objective then goes on to mean afterwards, that which is not only given and verifiable for all but presents itself as an object. This then excludes the subject, the experiencing person, already*. (Ontwerp V, p. 1)

> *Psychology as a science originates in a reflection, in a bending back over experience. Those who put it this way — Husserl put it this way and continued to put it this way throughout his career — thus* burden psychology with all the problems that arise in reflection. (Ontwerp V, p. 8, my emphasis)

> *For we have assumed, we have accepted as a fundamental proposition, that only that which presents itself in direct contemplation and experience may be the criterion of our knowledge,* that is, of our phenomenological understanding, not of all other [knowledge]. (Ontwerp V, p. 11, my emphasis, RvH).

[8] In this section I refer to quotes from the 'Design lectures' the way Linschoten himself did: in the upper right corner he gave every typed page a brief "header" together with the date of the lecture. I did not repeat the dates but refer to the number of the lecture and the relevant page number. Linschoten used "Ontwerp" to refer to the lectures on "Husserl's design of a phenomenological psychology." All quotes from the lectures are from the unpublished mimeographed copies found in the archive, and are quoted with the family's permission.

[9] I will come back to the spurious coupling soon.

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

> *But what does this mean? [...] When I make a statement at the scientific level, this statement describes something. That which it describes must be verifiable by my fellow practitioner of science based on that statement. He must be able to confirm or refute my statement to arrive at a new statement that is valid for all. He and I are concrete, ordinary, existing people of this world. Scientific agreement does not differ, as far as the form of conversation between practitioners is concerned, from the agreement that takes place in the marketplace. Only they are different objects. The level of abstraction is another.* (Ontwerp VI, p. 8)
>
> *[Psychology], starting from the description of the relation of the person to the life world, can never arrive at those scientific determinations, which have validity in the natural sciences. I cannot deduce from an analysis of experience why I breathe. In other words, one can say that psychological knowledge in the sense of Husserl (knowledge of the " Lebenswelt") has scientific priority before natural scientific knowledge. On the other hand, one must recognize that natural scientific knowledge is a form of knowing that can never emerge from psychology, which has its own new origin.* (Ontwerp VI, p. 10)
>
> *Seen in this way, psychology …is a doctrine of intentionality, and our concern is to formulate more precisely, what can be understood by intentionality.* (Ontwerp VI, p. 13)

I quoted extensively from the three lectures because they demonstrate how Linschoten developed his view and let his students join him as it were, to show how to get from pure subjectivity to optimal, obtainable objectivity (interpreted as intersubjectively shared views). You loose subjectivity but gain objectivity. In the *capita selecta* lecture on Rilke the same theme reoccurred, though from a literary perspective.

At the same time, he recognizes, and helps his students to recognize, psychology is not reducible to another discipline, nor can another discipline completely emerge form psychology. This has to do with what experience, and therefore also psychology can be about. So, he next discussed what in the words of Brentano is called the *intentionality*-aspect of psychology.

Intentionality

Ever since Brentano discussed it the concept of intentionality had an important role in phenomenology and psychology. To put it as briefly as possible in Linschoten's words:

> We are always conscious of something; there is no state of being conscious of nothing.
>
> [Linschoten distinguished] *….four meanings of 'intentionality':*
>
> *1. Awareness of*
>
> *2. Orientation toward*
>
> *3. Intention to*
>
> *4. Realization of* (Ontwerp IX, p. 1)
>
> *You will not find [in Husserl] a finished program, a clear final position on the problem of psychology as a natural science and/or as a* Geisteswissenschaft. *Husserl leaves both to their right. He recognizes the possibility and usefulness of the natural science-oriented psychology — physiological psychology — that was intensely practiced in his time in Germany, and, on the other hand, he is a great defender of the* geisteswissenschaftlich-*oriented psychology emerging in Germany*. (Ontwerp IX, p. 1).

In the last lecture but one of the 'design series' Linschoten questioned why Husserl never made clear how he saw the relation between the phenomenologically oriented and the natural science-oriented psychology. Linschoten says it is easy to answer this question: Husserl was a mathematician and philosopher and was very reluctant to get involved in actual psychological studies or express an opinion on psychologists' work, let alone criticize them. Later, others in the tradition thought otherwise, repeating that psychology should be done exclusively phenomenologically. They rejected the natural science approach of experimental psychology. Husserl could not choose between them or unite them under one heading.

Linschoten returned to William James, his book about James and the remark made by Husserl at the end of his life that James was the only psychologist who made it clear to him, Husserl, what the deep problem is of and for psychology. It is the study of humans as *organisms between other organisms* and humans as the bearers of an intentionality that can refer to the human mind. In that sense psychology can be seen as the (non-monozygotic) twin of a (Darwinian) biology.

James suggested that there was no more than a loose connection between both "subverses." Husserl suggested they must be seen in their relation to the one, uniting "*Lebenswelt*." That is, the world that all humans share, where red is red, hard is hard, and heavy is heavy. Where a blow on the head is painful for everyone, where thirst is thirst and tired is tired. This is a lifeworld where first experiences, the immediately given, almost at once will be cast into words and injected by common sense (*sensus communis*), and in our cultures will be drenched in the results of the sciences of past ages. Nevertheless, the primacy is with the daily reality, the desk on which a thesis is written, not the configuration of atoms connected with other atoms by mainly empty space. It is with the functions necessary and useful for survival, biologically as well as social and cultural.

In lecture Ontwerp IX, p.13 Linschoten referred to James' "pure experience" as the ultimate basis from which everything must start and come. The physical and the psychical are two sides of one coin; there is no separation between two worlds, and there is, at best, a distinction depending on the questions asked. I can feel pain when it hurts, and I can say where it hurts, e.g. my knee or head. The first pain is the same as the second, but the first refers to how it feels, and the second to where it is. The first is the subjective experience that nobody feels for me, but it still has the objective aspect of the place where everybody could see (in principle) what causes my reported pain feelings. I *am* my body constantly, every day, every moment, and I *have* a body (my body). The body is the crossroads where internal experience and external knowledge meet—two viewpoints of one raw material, two intentions.

In his last lecture of the design series (Ontwerp X), he defends and elaborates on James' observation that the distinction between the psycho*physical* and the "psycho*psychical*" (between the view that psychology is essentially a natural science and the view that it

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

is essentially a *Geisteswissenschaft*) has always between interpreted as an ontological question, a question of "what it is." James already noted that this was the wrong approach. It is not a difference of *being* but of *knowledge*. In naively experienced, daily life, the question is not whether my body or soul experiences a blow to the head or the beauty of a song. It refers to the complementarity principle that Linschoten borrowed from Niels Bohr. The "raw material" is neither "thing material" nor "think material." It only becomes matter or mind stuff because two different questions are asked. The phenomena of life (experiences, the given) are physical phenomena when asked from the perspective of the physical sciences; they are psychological phenomena from the perspective of psychology. The 'thing' is the same, the intentionality is different.

> *The unity of a worldview is always a construction because initially, to arrive at this worldview, I, first of all, left the totality of the naive pre-scientific experience [the given] and then must reconstruct it. To put a name to it as an example of whatever type of phenomenon, I must first retreat into a one-sidedness of questioning. That, after that, the answer is one-sided is no wonder. That an answer given to a different question from a different point of view shows a one-sidedness incompatible with the first answer is not surprising either. It is surprising only when we try to construct together the questions asked from one-sided points of view into a total worldview.* (Ontwerp X, p. 8).

Here still is reflected the issue of what Linschoten wrote in one of the last paragraphs of his James book. He referred to the "*besluit tot eenzijdigheid*," the decree to one-sidedness (Linschoten, 1959, p. 231).

In the 'Design series' of lectures he explored a large number of themes that returned in his last book, *Idols*. He shows how the utterly subjective, immediate experience necessarily forms the start of all science because science must work with the (now intersubjective) abstractions language provides of the essences of those experiences. If psychology is to be an objective science, it must go beyond the 'forever subjective' pre-reflective moments. But by doing that the pre-reflective moment will be lost for ever, it flows by in the stream of consciousness, leaving sediments as words on its banks. Thus, in the 'design lectures' the conclusion surfaces that he formulated more to the point in *Idols*: phenomenology may analyze subjective experience, but psychology must aim at objectivity, must avoid the idols of *sensus communis* psychologists, especially phenomenologists, are vulnerable to, and has to be aware of the self-implicated nature of psychology.

Experiment

After having focused on phenomenology in the lectures from 1956 till the first semester of 1959 Linschoten changed the subject. He probably had concluded it is important to study language as the medium of reduction of experiences into the essences with which scientific psychology had to work with. But also, as one of the possible biases human sciences can be vulnerable to. So, after his James book was published, in the second semester of 1959, Linschoten started lectures focusing on the experimental aspect of general psychology. In his archive, we found two series, one on *Levels of Organization in Perception* and on *Psycholinguistics*. The mimeographed lectures (in Dutch) show how he gradually introduced his students to how he and his colleagues did empirical research and how to evaluate and improve empirical research, including of other scholars. This may appear as a development, if not a change, of his thought away from phenomenology to what many considered positivism, as discussed in his ultimate book. It may have appeared as breaching with the phenomenologist tradition of Utrecht. For instance, in our interview with Amedeo Giorgi, he told us he had the impression he was no longer doing phenomenology, only experiments instead (Giorgi, 1999). However, was it a breach? Let us see.

One theme is the paradoxical nature found in James that using pure experience as the ultimate foundation of our knowledge of consciousness we end up with the study of behavior. Consciousness is not a thing, so it cannot be an object; it is only a *function* resulting from our ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Our experience is a function of our primary and second nature, especially the latter after verbalization into essences carried by language. It is almost self-evident, considering the ever-present intentionality of conscious experiences. On the one hand, we have our most subjective incarnated (embodied) reactions, and on the other hand, language to describe them a second later as *emotions*— which is primarily second nature and infected by common sense. Words are what psychologists need to work with, but often they confuse the words referring to the experience as the experience itself. The experience itself is not accessible to the psychologist, only to the person who experienced it. The psychologist—especially the psychotherapist—must rely on the words. Psychologists should be aware of the assumptions of psychology. They can only study descriptions, that is, language. This must have opened the eyes of some of the students. He used James' diagram of the "assumptions of psychology," (Figure 3) which contains the "irreducible data of psychology. [The psychologist] No. 1, believes Nos. 2, 3, and 4, which together form *his* total object and reports them ..." (James, 1890, pp. Vol. 1, 184). So, the description in a language is not the experience, it is behavior. Therefore, James reasoned, psychology is the study of behavior.

Levels of Organization in Perception

The lectures on Levels of Organization in Perception that preceded the Lectures on Psycholinguistics are narrowly related. In the 'Levels series,' Linschoten discusses Gestalt theory and its broader implications

Figure 3. *James's diagram of what the assumptions of psychology must be; from James, 1890, vol. 1, p. 184*

1	2	3	4
The Psychologist	The Studied Thought	The Thought's Object	The Psychologist's Reality

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

for psychology. He develops a theory of how, in general, we use levels or organization, in other words the structure of things, to explain their properties or behavior. Things, objects, bodies, or organisms can be described at their own level, but sometimes, we must go a level lower to explain how or why this object behaves as it does or has the properties it has. We know that atoms build molecules, molecules build cells, cells give life to organs, organs are part of organisms, etc. In the psychology of perception, retinal cells (rods and cones) produce signals that will travel (via the lateral geniculate nucleus) to the primary visual cortex (area V1). There, we can still observe how these signals arrive at specific spots in V1; we can still recognize their retinal (rod and cone) origins, as it were. This is a retinotopic system at a basic organizational level. However, next the nerves go to several different areas (the dorsal and the ventral streams, or the "where" and "how" pathways, respectively the ventral or "what pathway," areas V2, V3, V4, V5 and more) where it is no longer possible to differentiate the signals according to their retinotopic origin. We now are on a different level of organization. Like the primary level, this second level can be said to have its own principles. However, we cannot always predict the properties at level 2 from those at level 1. Higher properties are explained as organizational principles on a lower level, that restrict the organization on the next level. An organism is a well-ordered, well-organized collection of organs, organs are well-organized collections of cells.

In his lectures on levels of organization in perception, he stresses the fruitfulness of distinguishing levels as a strategy of discovery. He suggests that in perception at least six levels are involved, each with its own laws and regularities, but also how higher levels presuppose the lower levels (but not necessarily the reverse). In human perception we can find at least six levels of functioning. These are supported by bodily processes and structures and can sometimes partially be reduced to the physiological processes or anatomical structure. But the functional organization not always is reflected in the anatomical or physiological one. This is the consequence of the fact that psychological functions are defined—and therefore can be changed—from a different perspective than the anatomical of physiological way of functioning. He discusses the following levels of perception in a number of weekly lectures:

1. Photoreception – motor reception, segregating light and dark on a light-dark sensitive part of skin or group of cells.
2. Borderline formation – reinforcing light-dark contrasts segregate two parts of a field by a line.
3. Borderline interference or "space formation" –differences between the two retinal images provide depth cues (theme of his PhD thesis).
4. Figure formation – grouping borderlines and edges into wholes, Gestalts (e.g., the work of Biederman much later).
5. Meaning – "deciding" what things we see in the Gestalt.
6. Relative figure localization–the localization of a figure relative to its background (possibly giving rise to induced apparent movement, the theme of his experiments for his doctoral thesis); also work by Kubovy (1986) much later, Gibson (1966, 1978), ecological perception, Biederman (1987).[10]

He emphasized that it must be clear that these are levels that can be attenuated and made more precise. However, he demonstrated to the students how analysis of experimental results, resulting in answering the question of what is presupposed, can lead to experimentally testing new, alternative hypotheses that develop in the process of analyzing. All this is done by seeing the levels as hypothetical. He occasionally used the very phrase "my model", explaining that it is the presumed structure that may help to find more and better empirical tests and results. He also clearly gives a phenomenological analysis without the pretenses of finding the pre-psychological deep foundations phenomenologists are after. The start is always a finding that seems to be inconsistent with other results, and that makes one dig deeper for what could be a better idea. It inspires new experiments and new functions; it does not replace them. So, experiments make phenomenology better, phenomenology improves experiments.

To explain how, what or where we see configurations of visual elements (edges, lines, corners, etc.) as things and their properties and behavior, we cannot stay at those basic levels. For instance, Gestalt psychology did vital work at this level, explaining the many properties of perceptual Gestalts by what, at this particular level, can be interpreted as the organization of elements that are distinguishable as parts of the figure. That is the case when we say that the Gestalt is more than the sum of its parts and where the figure's ground explicitly plays a role in explaining the constancies of phenomenal perception.

However, this is where Gestalt psychology ended its important work—or better where the Gestalt psychologists stopped. Linschoten suggested that on the next higher level, at least one level higher than where Gestalt psychologists rested their case, principles of visual cognition (including recognition, memory, etc.) can be suggested to explain how we can do what we do in an optically arranged world, what objects we see, see where the objects are, how we move in spatial situations, etc. This is where, for instance, J.J. Gibson made the next step. He showed that the whole optical field is one of the more important factors in perceiving the what, where and how of things in situations.[11]

Psycholinguistics

One other theme in the levels of organization lectures was language. Thus, he introduced the series of lectures of the next semester. Most of his examples use word frequencies in a language, ignoring word meanings, grammar and word use at times, only to show how hidden regularities influence reactions to words (like "what is the opposite

[10] Note that Biederman discussed a model of levels of organization of perception that was much more detailed than Linschoten's level 4, but that Biederman's model was less expanded than Linschoten's. His Recognition-by-Components Theory started at edge extraction (more or less Linschoten's level three) and ended at his level 5.

[11] Although not explicitly mentioned, Linschoten may have thought of Gibson's publication in which he showed that the reduction to lab tests of pilots' capability to see depth, failed. To safely fly and land their plane pilots need to see the complete optical field, including the pilot's cockpit and the arrangement of instruments, to select the necessary cues for the achievement (Gibson, 1946). Obviously, Linschoten had read Gibson's work; Brunswik's is equally relevant in this respect but only in the last chapter of his Idols he showed he had seen Brunswik's work.

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

of…."). In many examples, he discussed how we depend on words to express, appeal to, and represent things and states of mind (he had read his Bühler).

It demonstrated how one can (or should) be for reduction and against reductionism. Typically, linguistics is considered the study of language on the higher level of grammar and semantics. Even in the ordinary sense, we think of words as the carriers of meanings and referents to things, ignoring how the meaning of the word depends on the organization of the sentence wherein it has a place and ignoring there is a wide gap between the thing and the word for a thing (this was James' observation, of course). And the sentence's meaning partially depends on the wider context of the section, chapter, book wherein it has a place.

James's remarks on psychology's assumptions must have led Linschoten to the lectures on psycholinguistics, or as he called it in the first of this series, on 'statistical linguistics'. But the themes discussed in the lectures go beyond linguistics, psycho- or statistical. He offered his students three insights. One is how to do empirical research. As an experimenter in psychology, always ask yourself what the situation means and meant for the participants. A physicist does not need to do that. Molecules or stars will not have experiences in a research design. Alternatively, use data that were produced not intended for research or where the producers of the texts were unaware of what they would be used for. That is why he often used data obtained from written (published) books, like novels, newspapers, etc., for his studies of the hidden statistical patterns of word frequencies. This is phenomenology of daily life.

Another insight was to show how humans act relatively uniformly when using language without being aware of it. He concentrated his research on the frequency of word use in written and spoken language. It is surprising how well he and his colleagues predicted the level of frequency with which people choose words when asked for, for instance, a synonym, an antonym, the abstract category or otherwise related word. People not only chose their antonyms for a word quite uniformly, but Linschoten et al could also predict rank orders of use of certain words or show that level of education predicts the use of emotion words, claiming greater subtlety of emotions experienced. Their statistical analyses of frequency of use did not use any semantical information.

Third, he showed how what he called abstraction works and demonstrated it. It is what he later, in *Idols,* called reductive modelling. The lectures offered the opportunity to let his students know he rejected the old and ever-repeated complaint of phenomenologists and other anti-experimentalists (for instance Van den Berg, 1952) that, in psychology, experiments were artefacts that reduced human beings into guinea pigs or numbers. This is entirely false, as Linschoten later formulated it in *Idols*. "The artefact…gives, although usually not an independent, self-reliant act, indications about the factors involved in the behavior. The artefact makes it possible to precisely analyze or diagnose the relevant elements by its artificiality. … By isolating them, investigable elements of behavior appear (surface) that cannot be found in spontaneous behavior or with the same properties. They make it possible to conclude the structures and functions on which spontaneous behavior is based" (Linschoten, 1964, p. 241).

Many psychologists interpreted James's orientation on language as the way toward behaviorism, but Linschoten clarifies that it would misunderstand James, thereby also implying himself. So next, in his lectures, he focused on the complementarity of experience and behavior. All behavior unmistakably and unavoidably involves experiences we call emotions. All behavior is undeniably and inevitably accompanied by conscious experiences. The James-Lange Theory of Emotions is the famous example. Linschoten tells his students that James points out that behavior can never be the causal source, the basis, of emotional experience, just as experience (emotion) is not the basis of behavior. The bear we are running from triggers the physiological arousal we interpret as fear. That is the embodied function that we have by nature, that forces us to mentally interpret and name it. This in no small part has become our second nature. It is formed by and, at the same time, forms the phenomena because it allows us to make that reaction somewhat understandable to others and ourselves through language. And ourselves! However, it is not enough for behaviorists to establish that people run away from bears. They run away from bears *and* have emotional experiences.

He also showed his students that language is a labyrinth without an exit: if we look up words in a dictionary and again look up the words we find there, and within a few iterations, we end up by the word we started with. We stay at the same level. We are trapped at the same level by limiting ourselves to word meanings in the dictionary. Meanings depend on other meanings and never will reliably connect with the external world. Even pointing towards a thing does not mean there cannot be misunderstandings, like interpreting pointing at a thing to indicate its color as indicating its shape, distance, or material properties. We find this theme again in his *Idols*, also using it to criticize Freud's analysis of his famous "Signorelli – Botticelli – Boltraffi" mistake. Freud self-analyzed it as repression; Linschoten however, offered three alternative analyses of the possible sources of his "repression."

Reduction or reductionism?

The 'levels lectures', as well as the 'psycholinguistics series' discussed the theme of reduction and reductionism. It is an important aspect of his discussion with phenomenologists. We should not, Linschoten explains, make the mistake of thinking that the functional levels are ontological, steady levels with well-defined anatomical or physiological borders. We are free to choose the levels of organization at the functional (read psychological) level we need. We should not forget that every time we refer to a basic first level, we imply a second level; when we refer to the second level, we imply a third level, and even there may be a zero. Here is lecturing Linschoten, the phenomenologist. He says that as soon as we talk about structure or organization levels, we need the three scales, or levels, of organization to explain what happens within the scales or between the scales. "An aggregate (higher level) often shows behavior or properties that its elements do not show any more" (Linschoten, 1959–1960; 1964, pp. 401–402).

The other mistake to avoid is perhaps one of the important things he arrived at in the lectures and later expanded on in his *Idols*: never will it be possible when working with levels or organization,

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

to ignore the properties (or laws) at the higher level when reducing them to a lower level. Properties at a lower level can help understand and explain why, on a higher level, things are or happen the way they do. However, it only makes sense to go back to a lower level to explain the events at the higher level exhaustively. "Making clear this concept 'level of organization' answers two questions: those of the overly ambitious claims of reductionism, as well as those that reject totalitarian views that reject any reduction" (Linschoten, 1964, p. 401)

Other circumstantial evidence

Many of Linschoten's students and colleagues considered his *Idols* a breach with his phenomenological past and colleagues. However, based on analyzing his lectures it seems safe to conclude that in the period between his James volume (Linschoten, 1959) and his *Idols* (Linschoten, 1964), there was no change in philosophy. Obviously, there is a difference of accent in both books, but the themes of what he considers important in psychology and for psychology remained the same: perception and language as the main psychological subjects, self-implicatedness, second nature, careful analysis and subsequent rigorous empirical testing or even interaction and mutual correction of phenomenological analysis and experimental research as epistemological elements. What also changed was the tone. The James book was written as a scholarly, serious argument for his interpretation of James. *Idols* was written in an ironical, almost teasing and sometimes even aggressive tone directed at the false prophets of phenomenology and experimental psychology. The question remains whether there were more indications of the continuity of his views.

The 1953 draft of a chapter on methodology

The archive contained a manuscript that offered an opportunity for another check of the claimed continuity. It is the draft of an earlier, still handwritten chapter found in a few of his notebooks. We made a copy, enlarging the original by two because Linschoten's handwriting was very dense and almost minuscule. Most elaborate in the text was a more or less finished chapter for a planned book provisionally called *Introduction to Psychology*. The chapter's title was *The Methodology of Psychological Research* (Figure 4).

According to the date (upper right corner), it was written in a few days in May and June 1953. The complete text of the chapter (without notes) is 26 pages long. Although his handwritten text is hardly readable (Figure 4), it demonstrates that he had not changed his mind shortly before publishing his *Idols* on the subject of phenomenology and experiment. A few of the eleven theses summarising the text's sections are about the relation between phenomenology and experiment (Figure 5).

Thesis III reads, "*Careful and adequate experimental investigation of a phenomenon requires one to ask about the role of the person as a "factor" in the situation in which the phenomenon occurs and then subject this situation to phenomenological analysis."*

Thesis IV reads, "*In psychological research, phenomenological and experimental analysis imply each other; they cannot replace each other."*

So even before he wrote his PhD thesis, and when he had hardly started working on it, he had clear ideas about the complementarity of phenomenology and experiment. Although he did not use the word complementarity, he obviously meant more than that they were to be combined.

"Bij besluit tot eenzijdigheid"

Linschoten wrote the chapter long before he published his his book on William James, probably when he started writing his PhD thesis. In his PhD thesis he had to reflect on how experiment and phenomenology were related. He considered his PhD thesis as a

Figure 4. *Handwritten manuscript of a chapter titled The Methodology of Psychological Research; An Account of Some Phenomenological Principles*



ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

Figure 5. *Two theses from the manuscript for a chapter on the methodology of psycho*



defense of an autonomous, that is irreducible psychology and an exercise in experimental phenomenology, a phenomenology that is necessary to discover the structure of the phenomenal experience. But he did not claim in his PhD thesis that the phenomenological analysis was more fundamental. No lip service was paid to either phenomenology or experiment.

This makes clear how we should interpret one of the ultimate paragraphs of the James book:

> *What does "coming to feel at home" mean in a new community or with new people? It simply means that we want to know, when we come to live in a new room, whether there are draughts in our back, how the doors open, which doors will open, who can enter it, what corners and closets we will find. After a few days, this strangeness disappears. Thus, it is in philosophy and science in general; it is an attempt to feel at home in the multiverse. We will only partially succeed* **by decree of sidedness**. *We choose a point of view from which we can observe the phenomena and from which we try to reduce them to a formula. Not everyone chooses the same point of view, and thus, our formulae differ. Different points of view lead to different formulations. However, is the one excluding the other? Should we not say that they complement each other? Is a mechanical explanation of the world incompatible with a teleological one? They are compatible when we understand what complementarity means.*[12] *They are compatible when we realize that they are views on the same life-world, that "the deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience" [James], and that different viewpoints* must *see the phenomena in different contexts and* must *lead to different problems, that* must *result in different answers… It gives the opportunity to choose between two points of view: the description and analysis of experience and body in relation to their intentionality, and the description and analysis of experience and body in spatio-temporal relation to the reality as experienced. The first leads to a* descriptive, *the second to what is called an* explanatory *psychology. When they are separated emerge a 'geisteswissenschafliche' and a 'natural science' psychology that do not longer understand each other due to their absolutization, or even exclude each other. William James wanted to save their interdependency*. (Linschoten, 1959, pp. 231–232, my emphasis).

When we look up the translation of the bold emphasized paragraph in Giorgi's translation, it reads, "…but this is only partially successful **when we decide to confine ourselves to a one-sided view**." This translation misses the point Linschoten wanted to make. Linschoten used the Dutch phrase "*bij besluit tot eenzijdigheid*," not the phrase "*als we besluiten ons tot een benadering te beperken*" or something like that. "*Bij besluit tot*'" implicitly refers to an important phrase in the Dutch lawmaking system, "*Bij Koninklijk Besluit …*," refers to a governmental decree with the power of material law.[13]

[12] In Giorgi's translation (Linschoten, 1968) this sentence was omitted or forgotten.

[13] Often, it specifies room left for upcoming interpretations or later deemed necessary specifications of a formal law by issuing a rule "by Royal Decree." A Royal Decree has the power of a law in the material sense, can be issued without parliamentary permission and can be tested against the constitution.

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

Linschoten must have intended this in his choice of words. The intended meaning could be *temporarily* restricting yourself to one or the other of the complementary approaches. After having done so this can be "tested against the complementary principle," as it were, that functions as the constitution. From the complementarity principle's perspective, neither one is preferred or privileged. They only fill in the details the other approach left out. I claim this to be the lens through which to read Linschoten's *Idols* and his James book retroactively.

More indications support this. It would be too much to discuss them all extensively. I will refrain from discussing his PhD thesis here (but see Linschoten, 1956a; Van Hezewijk, 2019a; Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2024), and only refer to a few publications of roughly the same period (Linschoten, 1961b, 1963a, 1963b). I urge to read the complete texts and not only the titles of the articles. Although the titles of these articles, published one year before his *Idols* was published, seem to imply that psychology should be a *phenomenological* psychology, close reading confirms that the implied view is a psychology under the complementarity principle. As he specified in one of the closing paragraphs of *Idols,* the complementarity could best be viewed as a division of attention (intention, even), where phenomenology would have the hypothesis-finding task and experiment the hypothesis-testing task. Both are "*unumgänglich*" (indispensable) in a serious science. Neither is more privileged. Especially when we remember how his PhD thesis intended to analyze the *structural relations* (not the causal relations) of binocular depth perception using a phenomenological approach, which was immediately followed by 130 experiments that partially tested, partially helped to discover the structure of binocular depth perception, this could be seen as an earlier example of his view on the relation between experiment and phenomenology.

Conclusion

In this article, I claimed that Linschoten's philosophical ideas of how phenomenology and experiment relate in and for psychology never changed fundamentally. Reading only a few of his works may have reinforced readers to think that he drastically changed his view in his ultimately published book. However, from the first steps in his career till his last writings, published and unpublished, he emphasized the indispensability and complementarity of phenomenology, experiment and history. His lectures were clear and seriously focused on what he promised his students, for instance, on what Husserl's "design" of psychology actually was. He told them to see phenomenology as "nothing but an attempt to make explicit what actually underlies all human behavioral science … an attempt to make explicit the presuppositions that are taken for granted in scientific and everyday thinking" (Ontwerp XV, p.9) It led to relativizing Husserl's phenomenology and opened the door to a phenomenology of everyday life, which could improve experimental psychology. He showed how objectivity—interpreted as intersubjectivity—was possible without rejecting or neglecting pure subjectivity as a starting point. The personal, immediate, direct, non-reflective reactions to the environment needed phenomenological analysis to lift them out of the ongoing stream of experiences and become a phenomenon "which is accessible and verifiable by everyone (in principle to everyone), not as the final arbiter of knowledge claims, but as the starting point for thorough investigation and empirically tested theories and hypotheses. In *Idols,* he goes as far as possible to suggest how James's complementarity principle could lead to the science William James had hoped for.

In the present article I only discussed a few examples of what he taught his students in his lectures. Before he wrote and published the book on James, the lectures had helped to articulate his thoughts about phenomenology, and its place in science. After its publication, he continued lecturing and shaped his thoughts toward his *Idols*. The author of the book on James was well trained as an experimenter[14], so he wrote about who he considered had paved the road to phenomenology. The author of *Idols* was well informed in phenomenology, so Linschoten wrote his *Idols,* which many interpreted as his conversion to experiment and modeling, as a phenomenologist. There is much overlap in the subjects of the chapters between both books and the lectures in between. Even the way he discusses the subjects is similar, although in *Idols* irony was used to create some distance between himself and others with different (often phenomenologist's) positions (including some views he himself had published earlier). Some of the examples I discussed could have been used in either of the books, for instance, the Kluger Hans example.

It is clear, William James has been an important inspiration to Linschoten. However, he went further than James (whose *Principles* of course was published almost 70 years earlier). Especially in the chapter on Experience and Things (Chapter VI) and Experience and Behavior (VIII) of his book on James, readers could already have read the cues to Linschoten's later position in *Idols*. William James's focus on the complementary nature of experience and experimental psychology becomes clear in these chapters. Linschoten follows James's view that psychology should, first and foremost, be the analysis of the structure of our personal experiences. That will always be necessary to make psychology the scientific study of the relation between experience and behavior and the nature of what is the world of objects and experience. However, experience and consciousness are not objects; they are solely complex functions available to human beings thanks to their biological and psychological nature. Therefore, elaborated Linschoten, neither phenomenology nor experiment on their own will be sufficient; neither can make the other superfluous.

So, Idols is the outcome of his own long and winding road of finding out how to keep psychology united. Already in his student years he had seen how experiments were necessary to test ideas and demonstrate effects, when nevertheless phenomenology made clear what these ideas really meant. The book on James must have made clearer what would make psychology a serious science. In his lectures at that time, he discussed the themes that are the core of the philosophical issues needing to be resolved: the apparent gap between subjectivity and objectivity, the tension between a thing like character of consciousness (and other mental functions) in a

[14] Linschoten's PhD thesis on binocular depth perception (1956a) reported 130 experiments. His master theses (Linschoten, 1949, 1950), about induced movement, reported results of four experiments.

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

Figure 6. *Five possible couplings between experimenter E, participant O, and his instruments. See text for explanation*



natural science approach and the floating intentionality thereof from the geisteswissenschaftliche perspective. Both are reductions, neither are to be seen as pleas for reductionism. His lectures on levels and on psycholinguistics amplified themes like this using examples. There is ample attention paid to the fallacy of phenomenologists and pseudo-phenomenologists (like Freud), who claim that their approach is more fundamental than experimental research or that phenomenology makes experiments unnecessary. However, he also criticizes bad experimentation and what is falsely presented as empirical research. His example of Kluger Hans is a metaphor for the situation of many psychologists who claim to offer insights into other people without realizing that he projects his own idols or the idols of his culture as the object of his study. Which evolves into his schemes of the different couplings (Figure 6) which map the complex types of relation between the researcher (E) and his object (O), and the 'stimulus' (x), the response (r) and the measurement (m) coupling them, in several situations that differ in degree of interdependence. Due to the self-implicatedness, one often finds the psychologist entangled in a situation he calls a system of spurious coupling (Figure 6e). In this situation, E is seduced to be both the investigator E and the experimental subject O. The system of couplings clearly is an important elaboration of how James's fourfold assumptions of psychology could be employed rightly and wrongly in modern research settings. It shows when objectivity can be possible and where it is violated.

Idols focuses on the science side of complementarity, while the James book orients to the phenomenological side of the coin. In both, he makes it clear that they need each other. When in his inaugural lecture he accepted the chair of psychology (Linschoten, 1957), his final words were for his students. He promised them that he would always teach the unity of psychology as the discipline where phenomenology, experiment, and history belong together inseparably. He never broke his promise and had never intended otherwise.

References

Bacon, F. (1620/1899). *Novum Organum*. The Colonial Press.

Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition-by-Components: A Theory of Human Image Understanding. *Psychological Review*, *94*(2), 115–147.

Buytendijk, F. J. J. (1964). In Memoriam Johannes Linschoten 1925-1964 [Obituary Johannes Linschoten 1925-1964]. In *Jaarboek der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht 1963-1964* (pp. 9–11). Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht.

Buytendijk, F. J. J., & Strasser, S. (1965). Letters Buytendijk _ Strasser _ Buytendijk,. In. Nijmegen: Katholiek Documentatie Centrum, Radboud University,.

De Ridder, D. (1992). Favorieten van de psycholoog [Favorites of the psychologist]. *De Psycholoog*, *27*, 444–446.

Dehue, T. (1990). *De regels van het vak; Nederlands psychologen en hun methodologie 1900-1985* [The rules of the trade; Dutch psychologists and their methodology 1900-1985]. Van Gennep.

Dehue, T. (1995). *Changing the rules: Psychology in the Netherlands 1900-1985*. Cambridge University Press. (Original title: De regels van het vak; Nederlandse psychologen en hun methodologie 1900-1985)

Derksen, M. (1997a). Are we not experimenting then? The rhetorical demarcation of psychology and common sense. *Theory and Psychology*, *7*(4), 435–456.

Derksen, M. (1997b). *Wij psychologen: Retorica en demarcatie in de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse psychologie* [We the psychologists; Rhetorics and demarcation in the history of Dutch psychology]. Groningen University (Ph.D. Thesis).

Derksen, M. (1999). De erfenis van Linschoten [Linschoten´s legacy]. *De Psycholoog*, *34*(May), 197–200.

Dijkhuis, J. H. (1999, 18–5). *Interview with Jos Dijkhuis* [Interview]. Utrecht;

Duijker, H. (1964). Idolen uit machines?; Enige beschouwingen naar aanleiding van het porthuum verschenen werk van J. Linschoten: "Idolen van de psycholoog" [Idols from machines? Some thoughts with reference to the posthumously published work by J. Linschoten, "Idolen van de Psycholoog"]. *Nederlands tijdschrift voor de psychologie en haar grensgebieden*, *20*(10), 623–644.

Gibson, J. J. (1966). *The senses considered as perceptual systems*. Houghton Mifflin.

Gibson, J. J. (1978). The ecological approach to the visual perception of pictures. *Leonardo*, *11*, 227–235.

Giorgi, A. (1965). Phenomenology and experimental psychology: I. *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, *5*(3), 228–238.

Giorgi, A. (1966). Phenomenology and experimental psychology: II. *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, *6(1)*, 37–50.

Giorgi, A. (1983). Concerning the possibility of phenomenological psychological research. *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, *14*(2), 129–169.

Giorgi, A. (1999, May). *Interview with Amedeao Giorgi* [Interview]. Utrecht;

Husserl, E. (1950). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* [Ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy]. Felix Meiner Verlag.

James, W. (1890). *Principles of Psychology, vol. 1&2*. Dover.

Kockelmans, J. J. (Ed.). (1987). *Phenomenological Psychology: The Dutch School*. Martinus Nijhoff.

Kubovy, M. (1986). *The psychology of perspective and Renaissance art*. Cambridge University Press.

Kusch, M. (1995). *Psychologism; A case study in the sociology of philosophical knowledge*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203983898

Linschoten, J. (1949). *Ontwerp van een fenomenologische theorie der bewegingswaarneming; Deel 1: De beweging in de objectieve ruimte* [Theoretical thesis for the doctoral exam, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht [now Utrecht University]]. Utrecht.

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20

Linschoten, J. (1950). Logische en phenomenologische analyse der bewegingsverschijnselen [Logical and phenomenological analysis of the movement phenomena]. *Tijdschrift voor philosophie*, *12*(4), 668–728.

Linschoten, J. (1951). Over de Humor [On Humor] [Brief version of a lecture presented 27 October 1951 at the catholic department of Ut Ommes Unum Sint, Utrecht.]. *Ut Ommes Unum Sint*, *5*, 1–3.

Linschoten, J. (1952). Experimentelle Untersuchung der sog. induzierten Bewegung [Experimental study of so-called induced movement]. *Psychologische Forschung*, *24*(1), 34–92.

Linschoten, J. (1954). Die Strasse und die unendliche Ferne [The street and the far]. *Situation*, *1*, 236–260.

Linschoten, J. (1955a). *Das Experiment in der phänomenologische Psychologie* [The experiment in phenomenological psychology; photocopy of the manuscript for a lecture in Bonn].

Linschoten, J. (1955b). *Het experiment in de phaenomenologische psychologie* [photocopy of a typed manuscript, incomplete, probably 1955; served possibly as a draft for a talk in German,].

Linschoten, J. (1955c). Über das Einschlafen--I Einschlafen und Erleben [On going to sleep I: Going to sleep and experiencing]. *Psychologische Beiträge*, *2*(1), 70–97.

Linschoten, J. (1956a). *Strukturanalyse der binokulären Tiefenwahrnehmung: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung* [Stuctural analysis of binocular depth perception: An experimental study. (Ph.D. thesis, printed with support by ZWO, the Netherlands, and with a foreword by Wolfgang Metzger)]. Wolters.

Linschoten, J. (1956b). Über das Einschlafen--II: Einschlafen und Tun [Falling asleep II: Falling asleep and activity]. *Psychologische Beiträge*, *2*(3), 266–298.

Linschoten, J. (1957). *A gentle force; Beschouwingen over het associatiebegrip. Inaugurele rede Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht* [A gentle force; Considering the Concept of Association. Inaugural address Utrecht University]. Wolters.

Linschoten, J. (1959). *Op weg naar een fenomenologische psychologie: De psychologie van William James* [On the way toward a phenomenological psychology: The psychology of William James]. Uitgeverij Erven J. Bijleveld.

Linschoten, J. (1959–1960). *Lectures on levels of organization of visual perception I- XIV* [mimeographed registration of weekly lectures]. Psychological Institute Utrecht University.

Linschoten, J. (1961a). *Auf dem Wege zu einer phänomenologischen Psychologie; die Psychologie von William James* [On the way to a phenomenological psychology; The psychology of William James] (F. Mönks, Trans.). W. de Gruyter.

Linschoten, J. (1961b). Die phänomenologische Methode in der Psychologie [The phenomenological method in psychology]. *Acta Psychologica*, *19*, 514–515.

Linschoten, J. (1963a). Die Unumgänglichkeit der Phänomenologie [The unavoidability of phenomenology]. *Jahrbuch für Psychologie und Psychotherapie*, *10*(3/4), 177–185.

Linschoten, J. (1963b). Fenomenologie en psychologie [Phenomenology and psychology]. *Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte*, *55*, 113–122.

Linschoten, J. (1964). *Idolen van de psycholoog* [Idols of the psychologist] (2nd ed.). Uitgeverij Erven J. Bijleveld.

Linschoten, J. (1968). *On the way toward a phenomenological psychology: The psychology of William James* (A. Giorgi, Trans.). Duquesne University Press.

Linschoten, J. (1971). The inevitability of phenomenology. In A. Giorgi, W. F. Fischer, & R. Eckartsberg (Eds.), *Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology* (pp. 49–59). Duquesne University Press.

Spinhoven, P. (1999). *Idolen van de klinisch psycholoog (Oratie)* [Idols of the clinical psychologist (Inaugural lecture)]. Leiden University.

Terwee, S. (1987). Het essentialisme van Johannes Linschoten [The essentialism of Johannes Linschoten]. *Psychologie en Maatschappij*, *11*, 24–44.

Terwee, S. (1990). *Hermeneutics in psychology and psychoanalysis*. Springer Verlag.

Van den Berg, J. H. (1952). *Psychologie en Theologische Antropologie*. G.F. Callenbach.

Van Hezewijk, R. (2019a). Phenomenology, experiments and the autonomy of Psychology: The earlier work of Johannes Linschoten. *Revista de Historia de la Psicologia*, *40*(3), 13–31. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2019a12

Van Hezewijk, R. (2019b, 8–10 May, 2019). *Psicología: Una disciplina autónoma; La disertación de Johannes Linschoten* [Oral presentation]. XXXII Symposium de la Sociedad Española de Historia de la Psicología, Madrid.

Van Hezewijk, R. (2024, 8–10 mayo 2024). *La ironía del fenomenólogo; Hans Linschoten y el mito del positivista* XXXVI SIMPOSIO DE LA SOCIEDAD ESPAÑOLA DE HISTORIA DE LA PSICOLOGÍA, Salamanca, España.

Van Hezewijk, R., & Stam, H. J. (2007, 25–29 June 2007). *Psychology as an autonomous discipline: Johannes Linschoten's dissertation* First Joint Meeting of the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences and CHEIRON The International society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences, University College Dublin, Ireland.

Van Hezewijk, R., & Stam, H. J. (2024). *The indispensability of phenomenology, experiment and history; Life and Work of Johannes Linschoten (1925-1964)*. Palgrave/Springer Nature.

Van Kaam, A. (1966). *Existential foundations of psychology*. Duquesne University Press.

Van Strien, P. J. (1993). *Nederlandse psychologen en hun publiek: Een contextuele geschiedenis* [Dutch psychologists and their audience; A contextual history]. Van Gorcum.

Vlek, C. A. J., & De Klerk, L. F. W. (1965–1966). Boekbespreking Prof.dr. J. Linschoten, Idolen van de psycholoog [Book review Prof.dr. J. Linschoten, Idols of the psychologist]. *Hypothese*, *10*(1), 19–24.

Zwaan, E. J. (1978). *De eenheid der methodologie (Oratie)* [The unity of methodology] [Inaugural address]. Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht (Utrecht University).

ISSN: 2445-0928 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5093/rhp2025a20