HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL -THE FORGOTTEN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENT

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By 1907, Henry Rutgers MARSHALL was recognized for such valuable contributions to the advancement of psychology that his peers elected him president of the American Psychological Association. He was 55 years old at the time, and yet twenty years later, at the time of his death, he had totally faded from the limelight in psychology. Indeed, his death went unnoticed in the American psychological periodicals, a unique distinction among the presidents of the APA. Except for the obituary notice in the *British Journal of Psychology* (MYERS, 1927), there was no mention of his death in the psychological literature.

Today MARSHALL's name is clearly not a household word, even among psychologists with considerable historical sophistication. The early APA presidents are a veritable *Who's Who* in the history of psychology -HALL, JAMES, BALDWIN, CATTELL, ANGELL, DEWEY, MÜNSTERBERG, etc. The name of Henry Rutgers MARSHALL seems totally out of place in that distinguished company. Additional evidence of MARSHALL's disappearance from psychological prominence comes from R.I. WATSON's *Eminent Contributors to Psychology* (1974, 1976). That work contains the names of 538 individuals whose contributions to psychology were rated by a panel of expert judges. The highest rating score that could be obtained by any individual was

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27. Averaging the ratings for the first twenty-five presidents of APA produces a value of 23.1. However, that score is based only on 24 of the initial 25 APA presidents; H.R. MARSHALL, the 16th president of APA, was not even among WATSON's 538 eminent contributors.

MARSHALL's career in psychology lasted slightly more than 30 years. During that time he authored seven books and more than 50 articles in the psychological and philosophical literature. His writings were often cited by TITCHENER, and he was close enough to William JAMES to write his obituary for *Science* in 1910. Why then has MARSHALL been forgotten in the history of psychology?. The answer to that question is the subject of this paper.

MARSHALL was born in New York City in 1852. After graduation from Columbia College in 1876, where he had earned his baccalaureate and master's degrees, he studied architecture and in 1878 began practice in that profession -the vocation he would pursue until his death. MARSHALL was not, by training or profession, a philosopher or psychologist. Both fields were, for him, an avocation, indeed, a life-long, part-time pursuit that grew out of his interest in what MYERS (1927) has called the theory of art and the nature of the beautiful. MARSHALL became an international authority on aesthetics, and although he never held an academic position, he did deliver a series of lectures on that topic at Columbia, Yale, Princeton, and Harvard.

Clearly his less than total involvement with psychology worked against his continued recognition in the field. He *was* an architect. His entry in the *National Cyclopedia of American Biography* (1909) is in the section of architects, the entry in the 1926-27 *Who's Who in America* lists him as an architect, and his *New York Times* obituary (1927) featured the headline "Henry R. Marshall, Architect, 74, Dies". His professional identity was clear and he practiced as an architect in New York City for nearly 50 years. He was elected a Fellow of the American Institute of Architects and was president of the New York chapter of AIA from 1902 until 1904. For many years he was active with the Art Commission for the City of New York, and at the time of his death he was Executive Secretary of that agency.

However, it was not MARSHALL's involvement in architecture that caused him to be forgotten in psychology. Nor was the fact that he held no full-time academic position, and thus had no students who might become disciples, a major determinant in the eventual obscurity of his name. While these circumstances would qualify as potential handicaps, they are also descriptive of other individuals whose names are remembered in psychology. In the end, it was MARSHALL's brand of psychology that assured his decline, a brand of psychology that fiercely held on to the old ways in psychology, long beyond the time when it was fashionable to do so.

MARSHALL's writings in psychology embraced a number of topics in addition to his emphasis on aesthetics: intelligence, sensation, consciousness, emotion, religion, instinct, synesthesia, time perception, race relations, dreams, psychotherapy, and war. This paper will focus on an important subset of his ideas, that is, those that specify psychology in terms of its subject matter and its appropriate methodology. In brief, his psychology was a unique blend of TITCHENER and JAMES. He clearly was attracted to structural psychology and argued in favor of introspection as the ultimate authority

among psychological methods. Yet he opposed what he viewed as the artificiality of the dissection of consciousness that was characteristic of structural psychology, and he particularly objected to its obsession with sensation.

MARSHALL's first book, and probably his most influential work, was *Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics* (1894). In this book, MARSHALL rejected the physiological and anatomical evidence that pointed to pleasure and pain as sensations. GOLDSCHEIDER's discovery of pressure spots, cold spots and heat spots in the surface of the skin were passed over as tentative conclusions in need of future modification. WUNDT and LADD were also cited as having similar doubts concerning the generalizability of GOLDSCHEIDER's conclusions about pain nerves.

Further, MARSHALL objected to the sensational view of pain and pleasure because of the ability of a wide range of psychic occurrences to elicit pain and pleasure. This point was expanded in a 1909 paper, partly in response to TITCHENER's book *Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention* (1908) which,contrary to TITCHENER's views, argued that a great number of pleasures and pains appeared to have no sensational component whatsoever. But perhaps the most devastating blow to the sensational theory, according to MARSHALL, was the lack of any environmental energy that corresponded to pleasure and pain, since "each presentation that is clearly recognized as sensation answers to a receptivity of energy from the environment, and each differentiation of sensation to a differential form of this energy"(1909a, p. 8). Thus, pain and pleasure should not be viewed in the realm of sensations, but as a mental quality that is psychologically, rather than physiologically, significant.

MARSHALL also objected to a view of pain and pleasure as purely emotional states, arguing that a definite object or the imagining of that object was antecedent to emotion, while no such conditions necessarily existed for pain and pleasure. In summary, "Pleasure-pain is not sensation, yet it is closely bound up with sensation; it is not emotion, but is closely bound up with emotion also" (MARSHALL, 1894, pp. 34-35). To reflect this alternative view of pleasure and pain, MARSHALL coined the term algedonics, and used this approach to elevate the problems of esthetics from a metaphysical state to a topic worthy of psychological inquiry.

Earlier views of esthetics had stressed sensational aspects (LOTZE), emotional aspects (James MILL), and intellectual factors (KANT, LADD). MARSHALL combined all of these approaches into a hedonic system which established pain-pleasure as the basis for all esthetic experiences and judgments (MARSHALL, 1892, 1893). Indeed, in MARSHALL's view, the esthetic and hedonic fields were inseparable in terms of consciousness, and attempts to do so would produce a pseudo-psychology.

MARSHALL's view of pleasure-pain as a complex mental phenomenon was characteristic of his belief about the nature of psychology. As a quality of all mental processes, pleasure-pain featured itself intimately in all consciousness (MARSHALL, 1909b). Like JAMES, he believed psychology was the science of mental life, and he found no favor with those psychologists enamored with physiology, nor with those intent on studying behavior.

In his 1894 book, MARSHALL did posit a physical basis for pleasure-pain, primarily due to his belief in a parallelism between all mental phenomena and all neural

activity. But he actually had little interest in physiology and was quite dismayed at the attention which that part of his book received in relation to the attention given to the non-physiological portions of the book (MARSHALL, 1909a). He repeatedly argued against those psychologists who sought physiological explanations for psychological events; it was a reductionism that he found too extreme. On this issue he was especially critical of the behaviorists. Those psychologists who espoused behavior as the primary target of psychology were victims of "an astounding confusion of thought" (MARSHALL, 1913, p. 715). To MARSHALL (1914), the studies of behavior were "primarily biological, and only incidentally psychological" (p. 181). In his 1913 article, "Is Psychology Evaporating?", MARSHALL lamented the fact that psychology was losing sight of its very purpose -a purpose that had established its separation from traditional philosophy. He referred to behaviorist as a "barbarous" term and chastized those behaviorists who claimed to be the only real psychologists.

Functional psychology was also the subject of his attack leading him to conclude that it was not really a branch of psychology at all:

> Thus it happens that the majority of these modern students of behavior, who still call themselves psychologists, have really abandoned the study of mental life. Their belittlement of the value of structural psychology, and their emphasis on the value of what they call functional psychology, thus actually amounts to little more than an acknowledgement of loss of interest in the study of psychology itself, and an expression of opinion that this study is worth while only so far as it can be shown to have practical application (MARSHALL, 1914, pp. 182-183).

American psychology was undergoing rapid changes and MARSHALL's ideas were fast disappearing from vogue. In the midst of explosive change, MARSHALL not only refused to change his conceptions of psychology, but he also rejected advancements in the theory of education and new tastes in music (MARSHALL, 1919). Near the end of his life he published his last book entitled *The Beautiful* (1924). It was largely a popular treatment of his initial book written 30 years previously. The review of that book was devastating, as MARSHALL was accused of understanding little of the realities of esthetics. "For those who think that learning is really about something and hence extremely important, the book is an unwelcome aid to the adversary...." (PRALL, 1925, p. 53). It was a sad ending to what had begun as a promising contribution to psychological theory.

MARSHALL continued to the end to restrict psychology to the study of mental events and to argue for the primacy of introspection among psychological methods. Although MARSHALL's interest in psychology did not decline, psychology's interest in him did. The growth of behaviorism would signal the death of his brand of psychology.

It is interesting to note that MARSHALL and TITCHENER, who shared many basic views in psychology, both died in 1927. Although they argued about the nature of consciousness and the importance of sensations, their psychological systems were in many ways compatible. Today the psychological systems of both men have almost totally vanished. That is, their early work is simply not part of the contemporary body of psychological knowledge. Yet TITCHENER's name is well known while MARSHALL's is not. Why is that the case?. Two reasons seem plausible:

1.- TITCHENER produced a number of doctoral students who were to leave their mark on American psychology, and

2.- TITCHENER's model of scientific rigor and his emphasis on experimental methodology for psychology were important beyond the demise of structural psychology. For MARSHALL, his legacy to psychology was his system, and as such, it proved to be no legacy at all.

SUMMARY

Henry Rutgers MARSHALL was elected the 16th president of the American Psychological Association in 1907. Yet 20 years later, his death went unnoticed by the American psychological community. Today his name is almost unknown in the history of psychology. This paper describes a portion of MARSHALL's work in the areas of esthetics and pleasure-pain; his view of the nature of psychology; and his resistance to change, as factors that have contributed to his obscurity.

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